E-Scooters seized

Response

Data has been provided below in response to your revised request. As explained in our previous response, there is no mandatory recording process for this type of information within any of our systems or departments. As such, while we have provided the recorded information as requested, the data from each respective department is conflicting and neither is likely to be accurate, for the reasons previously explained.

 

Privately-owned e-scooters recorded as seized within Niche:

 

Please see below the number of privately-owned e-scooters recorded as seized in each specified timeframe, within the relevant data field in our crime recording system, Niche:

 

1. between 1 October 2021 to 30 September 2022; 0
2. between 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023; 16
3. between 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024; 9 
4. between 1 October 2024 to 30 September 2025. 4

 

Please see below the data recorded by our Estates and Facilities department, which is responsible for disposing of seized e-scooters:

 

2023

e-scooters – 103

 

2024

e-scooters – 15

 

2025

e-scooters – 75

 

Please also find attached the requested intranet page on Micromobility.

 

Within this document, redactions have been applied to withhold names, email addresses and other contact details not intended for public use. Information revealing police tactics has also been redacted. These redactions have been made under the following exemptions:

 

 

Section 31(1) – Law Enforcement

Section 40(2) – Personal Information

 

Section 31 is a qualified, prejudice based exemption, therefore there is a requirement to articulate the harm in disclosure and to consider the public interest.

 

Harm in Disclosure:  

To disclose email addresses and contact details used for policing purposes would release information into the public domain that could be used by those intent on disrupting police services to interrupt operational policing.

 

Disclosure of information relating to law enforcement tactics could lead to those tactics being compromised.

 

Factors favouring disclosure: 

To disclose direct means of communication with the relevant departments displays transparency and accountability. There is a public interest in the communities we serve being made aware of the facts relating to this area of policing in order to ensure openness and transparency.

 

Factors favouring exemption: 

Disclosure of direct email addresses not intended for public use could result in teams being inundated with enquiries that do not pass through the usual route of our command-and-control system. Each enquiry received would have to be dealt with individually, which would abstract officers from their usual operational duties. In addition, those with criminal intent could use this information to cause disruption to the communication channels within the organisation. This could lead to operational difficulties as resources would need to be replaced in order to manage operational demand and maintain public safety.

 

Disclosure of information that undermines law enforcement tactics would hinder the prevention and detection of crime. More crime could be committed, and individuals placed at risk.

 

Balance Test   

As the email addresses and contact details are not intended for public use, the information would be of little use other than to those seeking to cause disruption.

 

Similarly, while there is a public interest in the transparency and accountability in relation to policing tactics and methods, there is a very strong public interest in protecting the ability of public authorities to enforce the law.

 

On balance, the harm in disclosure outweighs any public interest in releasing the information.  The decision is therefore to withhold the requested information in the interests of protecting our law enforcement capabilities.

 

 

Section 40 is a class based absolute exemption and there is no requirement to consider the public interest in this case.

 

Any information to which a request relates is exempt if it constitutes personal data and would contravene any of the data protection principles.  Personal data relates to a living individual who can be identified directly from the information, or identifiable indirectly in combination with other available information.

 

To disclose the information would identify individuals, which would breach principle 1 (lawfulness, fairness and transparency) of the Data Protection Act 2018.

 

This serves as a partial refusal notice under Section 17(1) of the Freedom of Information Act.