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Use of Statistical Modelling, Predictive Analytics and AI

Date of request: 27 August 2026
Reference: 17627943

Request

Thank you for your response. I acknowledge that my original request was broad. I have therefore narrowed the scope of the request and would be grateful if you could consider this amended request:

Please provide a list of any systems or tools currently operational that are used by the force that:

 

  1. use statistical modelling, predictive analytics, machine learning, or other algorithmic processing to combine or analyse data and produce a risk score, probability, ranking, classification or prioritised list relating to offending, victimisation, vulnerability, harm or another policing outcome; or

 

  1. use artificial intelligence to analyse or generate material for policing purposes, including image or video analysis, automated identification of people or objects, cold-case analysis, transcription or AI-assisted statements, or AI-assisted call handling and/or triage.

 

For each system, please provide its name and a brief description of its purpose.

 

This request excludes systems that merely store, manage or display information, and risk assessments completed manually by police personnel, such as DASH.

 

Your assistance in this matter is much appreciated.

Response

Information has been identified in relation to the following systems and tools that fall within the scope of your request.

 

Human oversight is applied in all cases. AI is used to support decision-making; it does not replace professional judgement.

 

 

System / Tool Purpose
Microsoft 365 Copilot / Copilot Chat Generative artificial intelligence tool used to assist officers and staff with productivity activities such as drafting, summarisation, information retrieval and analysis of information held within authorised Microsoft 365 data sources. It is used for administrative and productivity purposes and not authorised for use for operational decision-making or risk assessments.

 

Söze Söze is an AI‑enabled digital investigation platform used to help officers and analysts search, review, and connect large volumes of digital evidence quickly and securely. It is used to support investigations by identifying relevant information and links within datasets. It does not alter or generate investigative or evidential material.

 

GoodSAM (AI transcription and summarisation functions) Secure video calling platform used to facilitate contact with members of the public. AI capabilities are used to transcribe and summarise video calls and for record keeping purposes – but not for statement generation or evidential use.

 

DocDefender AI-enabled document redaction tool used to identify and redact information within documents for criminal justice and investigative purposes.

 

NICE Investigate Digital evidence management and analysis platform that includes capabilities such as transcription, video processing and redaction to support investigations and criminal justice processes.

 

Qlik Sense A system that provides data to help support in researching and drawing insight

 

Python No recorded information identified. Information on uses of Python are available at https://www.python.org/

 

Home Office / Vodafone Natural Language 101 Triage System Natural language processing tool used within the 101 telephony service to analyse the content of callers’ spoken responses and direct calls appropriately. The system is used to identify the nature of the enquiry and signpost callers where appropriate, including directing non-policing matters to alternative services. Human oversight remains available and the system supports, rather than replaces, operational decision-making.

 

To assist further, I have provided links below to previously published information of relevance to your request:

 

Our use of Artificial Intelligence | Avon and Somerset Police

 

Data science | Avon and Somerset Police

 

Acceptable use of Microsoft Copilot policy | Avon and Somerset Police

 

Predictive policing technologies, facial recognition and AI | Avon and Somerset Police

 

In addition to the above, I can neither confirm nor deny whether any additional information is held, in accordance with the following exemptions:

 

  • Section 24(2) – National Security
  • Section 31(3) – Law Enforcement

 

As Sections 24 and 31 are both qualified, prejudice-based exemptions, there is a requirement to explain the harm in confirming or denying and to undertake a public interest test. Please find this below:

 

Harm:

Having disclosed the information for high‑level, routine, non-sensitive use of these technologies, we can neither confirm nor deny whether we hold any further information that the technology is used to support counter‑terrorism, serious and organised crime or covert intelligence activity functions. The duty to confirm or deny is disapplied by virtue of sections 24(2) (National Security) and 31(3) (Law Enforcement) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. This response should not be taken as an indication of whether any additional information is held. 

 

Confirming or denying its’ use in counter‑terrorism (CT), serious and organised crime (SoC), or covert intelligence would enable hostile actors to infer the presence, absence or maturity of particular policing capabilities. This type of capability insight is of practical value to adversaries who routinely adapt their behaviour to exploit perceived weaknesses, overwhelm less technologically equipped forces, or adjust methods to avoid detection. Even a single confirmation or denial could be combined with publicly available information from other forces to build a detailed national picture of capability. This mosaic effect represents a realistic and actionable risk, providing information that could materially undermine national security and the effectiveness of law‑enforcement operations.

 

Public Interest Test – s24(2) National Security:

Factors in favour of confirming or denying: 

There is a strong public interest in openness and transparency about the use of advanced technologies in policing. Confirming or denying the existence of information could contribute to informed public debate about how emerging technologies are deployed, the safeguards in place, and whether they align with legal and ethical standards. Disclosure can enhance accountability, promote trust, and reassure the public that its’ use is subject to appropriate oversight.

 

Factors against confirming or denying: 

There is an overriding public interest in protecting national security. Confirming or denying the existence of information about this technology in CT, SoC, or covert intelligence would provide adversaries with useful insights into operational capabilities and priorities. Even a simple confirmation or denial could enable hostile actors to adjust methods, exploit potential gaps, or test thresholds. The resulting risk to national security would be real and more than trivial, and is not mitigated by partial or local confirmations, because the cumulative mosaic effect across multiple forces would still disclose sensitive capability at a national level.

 

Public Interest Test – S31(3) Law Enforcement:

Factors in favour of confirming or denying: 

There is a general public interest in understanding how advanced technology is used to support policing functions, including the efficiency and effectiveness of core processes, and in ensuring that novel technologies are used lawfully and proportionately. Confirmation or denial could support external scrutiny and promote confidence in policing practice.

 

Factors against confirming or denying:

Confirming or denying the existence of information relating to advanced technologies’ use in CT, SoC, or covert intelligence would be likely to prejudice the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension or prosecution of offenders, and the operation of law enforcement tactics and methodologies. Knowledge of whether specific capabilities exist, or do not exist, enables offenders to adapt behaviour, exploit capability gaps, frustrate investigations, and increase the cost and complexity of counter‑measures. The public interest strongly favours maintaining an NCND to preserve the effectiveness of law enforcement and the safety of the public.

 

Balance Test

For the reasons set out above, we can neither confirm nor deny whether we hold information indicating advanced technology is used in CT, SoC, or covert intelligence activity to support those functions. The public interest in maintaining the NCND position under sections 24(2) and 31(3) outweighs the public interest in confirmation or denial. This response should not be taken as an indication of whether any relevant information is held.

This serves as a partial refusal notice under section 17(1) of the FOI Act.

 


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